Private information can lead to inefficient bargaining between managers. I develop a property rights theory of the firm to analyze the optimal ownership structure that minimizes this bargaining inefficiency. I first show that a change in the ownership structure that reduces the managers' aggregate disagreement payoff increases the probability that they realize efficient trades but also increases the cost of disagreement and can lead them to trade 'too often.' I then show that joint ownership is optimal if the managers' expected gains from trade are large and that either integration or nonintegration is optimal if the expected gains from trade are small.
Introduction
Economists and practitioners have long believed that ex post inefficiencies play an important role in determining the ownership structures of firms. More than 60 years ago argued that the resources used to discover and haggle over the terms of trade constitute a major cost of market transactions and that these costs can be reduced if the transactions are brought into the firm.
1 Similarly, the modern transaction cost theory of the firm, as developed by Williamson ( , 1985 , argues that bargaining between firms over the sharing of quasi-rents can be costly due to the presence of private information and that these haggling costs can be reduced if the firms integrate. 2 More recently, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) report on a series of interviews with practitioners who design the governance structures of strategic alliances. In the view of these practitioners one of the three most important factors in determining governance structures of strategic alliances is "the need for governance structures to induce efficient behavior ex post, since contracts cannot." 3 In spite of the widely held belief that ex post inefficiencies are an important determinant of the ownership structures of firms, only few papers have formally analyzed this relationship. The literature on the property rights theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1985) and Hart and Moore (1990) ), in particular, has so far focused on how the ownership structures of firms affect the incentives of managers to make ex ante relationship-specific investments and has largely abstracted from ex post bargaining inefficiencies. Most contributions to this literature assume that bargaining between managers is efficient and analyze how changes in the ownership structures of firms, by changing the managers' disagreement payoffs, affect the ex post bargaining outcome and thus the ex ante investment incentives. 4 In contrast, in this paper I develop a property rights theory of the firm that focuses exclusively on ex post inefficiencies and abstracts from ex ante investment inefficiencies. I argue that managerial bargaining is often hindered by private information and that the size of the resulting bargaining inefficiency depends crucially on the ownership structure of the managers' firms. I then derive the optimal ownership structures that minimize the ex post bargaining inefficiency and note that they are frequently observed in the real world.
Suppose a seller who privately knows her cost of producing an input and a buyer who privately knows his valuation for it bargain with each other over its price. It is well known that the two 'managers' then have a strong incentive to misrepresent their valuations and that, as a result, they may fail to realize some efficient trades (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). In this paper I analyze how this 'classic' bargaining inefficiency depends on the ownership structures of the managers' firms. To see how the ownership structure affects the bargaining inefficiency, suppose that the managers need some machines to engage in production and that, before learning their private information, they can contract over the ownership distribution of these machines. In the property rights approach firms are defined by their physical assets. The ownership structures of the managers' firms are therefore determined by the ownership distribution of the machines -that is they are determined by who owns what machine. The key assumption in the property rights approach, and the key assumption I adopt in this paper, is that the ownership structure that the managers agree on ex ante only determines the payoffs the managers realize if they do not agree to trade ex post. Thus, changes in the ownership structures do not affect the amount of private information that the managers have or the degree to which they act opportunistically and only affect their ex post disagreement payoffs. I first analyze how changes in the ownership structures, by changing the disagreement payoffs, affect the managers' bargaining strategies and thus the bargaining inefficiency. I then derive the optimal ownership structure which minimizes the expected bargaining inefficiency and which the managers therefore agree on ex ante. I show that, depending on the size of the expected gains from trade and the nature of the physical assets, the optimal ownership structure can be integration, non-integration, or joint ownership. Thus, the classic bargaining inefficiency that arises when managers bargain in the presence of private information is minimized by frequently observed ownership structures.
The observation that non-integration can minimize ex post inefficiencies stands in contrast to Williamson ( , 1985 . As mentioned above, he argues that vertical integration eliminates the bargaining inefficiencies that can arise when two independent firms bargain with each other in the presence of private information. 5 I show below that bargaining between two managers can be inefficient even if they work for the same integrated firm and that vertical integration can actually increase the bargaining inefficiency. Thus, it can be the case that two managers who work for the same firm haggle more with each other, and thus waste more resources, than managers who work for two independent firms. This can be the case as long as the managers' human capital is important and they have some private information even if they work within the same firm.
Managers often adopt ownership structures that make them more dependent on each other by reducing their aggregate disagreement payoff. For instance, managers sometimes exchange 'ugly princess hostages.' 6 This refers to a practice in which managers exchange ownership of assets that are very valuable to themselves but which have little or no value to the other party. In the Japanese car industry, for instance, it can be observed that physical assets which are specific to a particular car manufacturer are sometimes owned by its supplier. 7 Also, firms sometimes reduce their aggregate disagreement payoff by selling off assets that can be used unilaterally during a conflict.
For instance, after settling a costly dispute about their alliance, KLM and Northwest
Airlines further increased their interdependence by eliminating their duplicate support operations. 8 It is often argued informally that managers take such actions to ensure that their trading relationships 'work well' and that conflicts are settled quickly. I show below that a change in the ownership structure that leads to a reduction in the aggregate disagreement payoff indeed reduces the probability of inefficient ex post disagreements.
However, it can also induce the managers to agree 'too often' and, of course, makes them worse off if they do end up disagreeing with each other. It is therefore not immediately clear whether a change in the ownership structure that reduces the managers' aggregate disagreement payoff is in their joint interest. My analysis shows that such an ownership change does make the managers better off if their expected gains from trade are large and that it makes them worse off otherwise.
The property rights approach that I adopt in this paper, that is the assumption that changes in the ownership structures only affect the managers' disagreement pay-offs, allows me to analyze the effects of changes in the ownership structures of firms on managerial bargaining inefficiencies without making assumptions about how such changes affect the degree of asymmetric information. This approach is different from that taken by Arrow (1975) and Riordan (1990) who also study vertical integration under imperfect information but who assume that vertical integration reduces the amount of private information that managers have. This assumption contrasts with recent papers by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002) which show that the incentives of agents to transmit information to a principal may actually be reduced, and thus informational asymmetries be increased, when a principal gains more control over an agent's actions. In the absence of clear theoretic and empirical predictions about how changes in the ownership structures of firms affect the degree of asymmetric information I deliberately abstract from any such effects and instead focus exclusively on how changes in the ownership structures influence the bargaining inefficiency by determining the managers' ex post disagreement payoffs.
While most of the existing property rights literature has focused on ex ante inefficiencies, there is a small but growing literature that has allowed for, and focused on, Finally, a paper that is similar to mine in spirit but different both in application and the economic mechanisms that it analyzes is Ayres and Talley (1995) . They analyze how divided legal entitlements can facilitate bargaining between plaintiffs and defendants. In their model divided legal entitlements can reduce the bargaining inefficiency by introducing uncertainty over which one of the parties will be the buyer and which one will be the seller. As such their analysis is closer to Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1985) than to this paper in which there is no uncertainty over the identity of the buyer and the seller.
In the next section I first describe the model. I then solve an example before analyzing the full model and discussing two extension. In Section 3 I discuss the implications and limitations of the model. Finally, I conclude in Section 4.
The Model
There are two risk neutral and liquidity unconstrained managers, a buyer (she) and a seller (he), and two physical assets a 1 and a 2 . The assets are owned by the managers.
The set of assets owned only by the buyer is denoted by A b ⊆ {a 1 , a 2 } and that owned only by the seller is denoted by A s ⊆ {a 1 , a 2 }. The ownership structure is given by an asset has the right to decide how it should be used. This is the key assumption in the property rights approach which defines ownership as a 'residual control right,' i.e.
right to decide how an asset should be used as long as it is not inconsistent with any prior contract. 9 Suppose, for instance, that the buyer owns one asset and the seller the other and that they fail to reach an agreement on the price of the input. Each manager can then use the asset that he or she owns to engage in production and can buy or sell For most of the analysis I assume that the ownership structures are deterministic and cannot be made contingent on information that is revealed after the ex ante contracting stage. I believe that in many situations this is a reasonable assumption to make and I discuss the implications of relaxing it in Section 2.4. 
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I refer to an ownership structure in which the buyer owns both assets as 'buyer integration' and define 'seller integration' accordingly. Under 'non-integration' each manager owns one asset and under 'joint ownership' both managers own both assets.
This model is closely related to that analyzed in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) .
They analyze a bilateral bargaining situation with two-sided asymmetric information and derive the optimal direct bargaining mechanism that maximizes the expected gains from trade. I differ from their analysis in that I do not take the managers' disagreement payoffs as given and instead allow them to contract over them and also by restricting myself to uniform, standard normal, and standard exponential distributions. In spite of this difference I can draw extensively on their results in solving the model.
An Example
Before 
and
(1 + 3d(A))
form a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the double auction. 
Thus, ex post efficient trading opportunities are not realized for any
At the interim stage, after learning the realizations of their trade payoffs, the managers always choose to participate in the ex post bargaining game since doing so ensures them a payoff that is at least as large as their disagreement payoffs. Ex ante the managers then contract over the ownership structure A. Since there is no private information at the contracting stage, I assume that bargaining over the ownership structure is efficient. The managers, who are risk neutral and not wealth constrained, then agree on the ownership structure that maximizes social welfare, independent of its ex post distribution. Formally, the managers choose the optimal ownership structure that
where W (d (A)) denotes social welfare and is given by
0 otherwise. The key to solving the contracting problem (1) is to understand how a change in the aggregate disagreement payoff affects social welfare. Suppose the managers consider a change in the ownership structure from A to A 0 and that this leads to a reduction in the
The effect on social welfare of such a change is given by
On the one hand, the managers realize a lower aggregate payoff if they disagree even after the ownership change. This effect is always negative and is captured by the first term on the RHS of (3). On the other hand, however, a reduction in the aggregate disagreement payoff also commits at least one of the managers to a more cautious bargaining strategy. This increases the probability that trade takes place ex post. In particular, for any realizations of π and c that satisfy π −c ∈ ¡ 3
¤ trade will take place only after the ownership change. The second term on the RHS of (3) captures the welfare implication of the increase in the probability of trade. Its sign is ambiguous and depends crucially on the size of the reduction in the aggregate disagreement payoff.
If the reduction is small, in the sense that While these trades are ex post efficient given d 0 , the managers would be better off realizing the maximum aggregate disagreement payoff than engaging in these trades.
Thus, for large reductions in the aggregate disagreement payoff, that is for
the increased probability of trade has an ambiguous effect on social welfare. −7/9) and it reaches its global maximum at d = 1. We can then distinguish two cases.
Thus the managers optimally choose the ownership structure that maximizes their aggregate disagreement payoff if, for a given distribution of trade payoffs, the expected gains from trade are small (i.e. when d is large) and they choose the ownership structure that minimizes the aggregate disagreement payoff otherwise. The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. Recall that a marginal increase in d increases the payoff the managers realize in the case of disagreement but also reduces the probability that efficient trades take place. 15 trading rule q * (·), the optimal transfer rule t * (·), and the optimal ownership structure A * that maximize social welfare
The Analysis
subject to the incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. 16 The ex ante contracting problem can be separated into two parts: first solve for the optimal trading and transfer rules for any given ownership structure and then, second, solve for the optimal ownership structure. The first part -finding the optimal mechanism (q * (·), t * (·)) -was solved by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and the optimal trading rule that they derive is described in the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. The optimal trading rule q
otherwise, where λ (d(A)) ∈ (0, ∞) solves the interim participation constraint
Proof of Lemma 1. This lemma follows immediately from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and I refer to their analysis. ¥ Note that since λ (d(A)) is strictly positive, bargaining is inefficient even if the managers play the most efficient bargaining game. In particular, just as in the example, the managers sometimes do not trade although it would be efficient for them to do so.
At the ex ante contracting stage the managers agree on the ownership structure that minimizes this well-known bargaining inefficiency. Thus, they solve
Note that social welfare again only depends on the aggregate disagreement payoff and not on the distribution of the individual disagreement payoffs. The effect of a change in the ownership structure on social welfare is also very similar to that described in the example. To see this suppose that the managers consider a change from A to A 0 with a corresponding reduction in the aggregate disagreement payoff from d to d 0 < d. The effect on social welfare is then given by
The first term on the RHS captures the welfare reduction that is due to the lower payoff the managers realize in case they still disagree after the change in the ownership structure and the second term on the RHS captures the effect on welfare that is due to the change in the probability of trade. A reduction in the aggregate disagreement payoff increases the probability that the managers trade ex post since a lower aggregate disagreement payoff relaxes the participation constraint (see (IR)) and thus increases the set of feasible trading rules from which the managers can choose at the contracting stage. The welfare effect of the increase in the probability of trade is again ambiguous:
while small reductions in the aggregate disagreement payoff only increase the probability that the managers realize ex ante efficient trades, large reductions in the aggregate disagreement payoff may induce them to also realize trades that are ex ante inefficient.
To understand what ownership structure optimizes this trade-off and thus maximizes social welfare, consider the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. The optimal ownership structure is given by
where 
Thus, just as in the example, the managers optimally choose the ownership structure that maximizes their aggregate disagreement payoff if, for a given distribution of trade payoffs, the expected gains from trade are small (i.e. when d is large) and they choose the ownership structure that minimizes the aggregate disagreement payoff otherwise.
Note that Proposition 3 does not rule out the possibility that A is always optimal, i.e.
Indeed, this is the case when the distributions of the trade payoffs are given by the standard exponential distributions in which case the social welfare function is monotonically increasing in d (see Figure 2) . 17 
More General Distributions
In the analysis above I have restricted attention to uniform, standard normal, and standard exponential distributions. In this subsection I extend the model by allowing for more general distributions. Suppose that the trade payoffs π and c are independently drawn from distributions with continuous and strictly positive density functions f b (π) and f s (c) and corresponding cumulative density functions F b (π) and F s (c) that satisfy the monotone hazard rate conditions
In this case Lemma 1 still holds so that optimal ownership structure is still given by the solution to (4) and the trade-off that the managers face when deciding on the ownership structure is still given by (5). The optimal ownership structure on which the managers agree is described in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. The optimal ownership structure is given by
where d crit ∈ [π − c, π − c) and A(F b (·), F s (·)) can be any ownership structure.
Proof of Proposition 4. It follows from Lemma 1 that
It is therefore still the case that the managers choose A if the gains from trade are small, i.e. when d is large. Also, when the gains from trade are large they may still want to choose an ownership structure that reduces the aggregate disagreement payoff.
However, I have not been able to prove that minimizing the aggregate disagreement payoff is always optimal in this case. 18 Thus, by how much the managers reduce the aggregate disagreement payoff if the gains from trade are large may depend on the precise form of the distribution.
Mechanism Design
So far I have restricted attention to non-contingent ownership structures. In principle, the managers could, of course, agree on a direct mechanism that makes the trading-and transfer rules and the ownership structures dependent on their interim announcements.
In this case the results from the model would no longer hold. The managers could then always relax the interim participation constraint by committing to very low interim disagreement payoffs and thus achieve first best efficiency. This is the case since, without an interim participation constraint, first best efficiency can be achieved in a bilateral bargaining situation with two-sided asymmetric information (see d'Aspremont-Gérard-
Varet (1979)).
For the results of the model to hold the interim and the ex post disagreement payoffs have to be 'linked,' in the sense that the former cannot be changed without also changing the latter. This is the case if ownership structures are deterministic. With contingent ownership structures, however, the interim-and ex post disagreement payoffs are not linked. The managers' choice of the optimal ownership structure is then not determined by the trade-off between a higher cost and a lower probability of disagreement that is central in the model.
In practice, I think that it may often be difficult for managers to get a court to enforce different ownership structures at the ex post and the interim stage. While a court can observe whether the managers disagree, it may not be able to observe whether their disagreement arose at the interim or the ex post stage. In other words, the court may not be able to determine whether the managers have actually bargained with each other over the sharing of possible gains from trade.
Discussion
The ownership structures that the model predicts are widely observed in the real world.
To see this, suppose, without loss of generality, that a 1 is more useful to the buyer than a 2 and that a 2 is more useful to the seller than a 1 . Thus,
Furthermore, consider the following definitions:
The assets a 1 and a 2 are 'non-synergistic' if and only if
DEFINITION 2. The assets a 1 and a 2 are 'buyer-synergistic' if and only if 
Hence, assets are buyer-synergistic (seller-synergistic) if, in the case of disagreement, the aggregate payoff is higher under buyer-integration (seller-integration) than under seller-(buyer-) or non-integration. The assets are non-synergistic if, in the case of disagreement, the aggregate payoff is higher under non-integration than under either buyer-or seller-integration.
Note that aggregate disagreement payoff is minimized under joint ownership, i.e.
when both managers own both assets. Under joint ownership neither manager can use the assets unilaterally to engage in production since, when both are owners, the usage of the assets has to be approved by both. 19 Thus,
In some special cases there may be other ownership structures that also minimize the aggregate disagreement payoff. Suppose, for instance, that the assets are 'strictly synergistic,' in the sense that b({a 1 }) + s({a 2 }) = b(∅) + s(∅). In this case asset a i for i = 1, 2 is only useful to a manager if he or she also owns asset a j for j 6 = i. The aggregate disagreement payoff can then be minimized by agreeing either on joint or on separate ownership of the assets. Thus, joint ownership always minimizes the aggregate disagreement payoff and in most cases it is the unique minimizer. To simplify the exposition I assume below that whenever the managers want to minimize the aggregate disagreement payoff they agree on the joint ownership of the assets.
It then immediately follows from Proposition 3 that the optimal ownership structure is given by In the basic property rights model with ex ante investments joint ownership cannot be optimal (see Hart (1995) ). Since joint ownership arrangements are, however, frequently observed in the real world it is important to develop theoretic arguments that might explain their existence. A number of recent papers have extended the basic property rights model and shown that under certain conditions joint ownership can provide optimal investment incentives. 20 This paper suggests an additional reason for why joint ownership can be optimal, namely that it can minimize ex post bargaining inefficiencies.
Joint ownership is not optimal when, for a given distribution of trade payoffs, the expected gains from trade are small, i.e. when d is large. Instead, in this case integration is optimal if the assets are synergistic and non-integration is optimal if the assets are non-synergistic. When the expected gains from trade are small, the managers disagree very often. The welfare cost of a reduction in the aggregate disagreement payoff is therefore quite large and dominates the welfare benefit.
The property rights literature has been criticized for not predicting asset clusters often enough (see Holmström (1999) ). Asset clusters are, of course, observed very often since most firms own large numbers of assets while their workers typically have no ownership rights over the assets they use in the production process. In a recent paper Holmström (1999, p.88) asks: "So why do firms own essentially all the nonhuman assets they use in production? Why do workers -or for that matter any other stakeholderrarely own any such assets? This strikes me as one of the most basic regularities that a theory of the firm needs to explain." In my model asset clusters arise when assets are synergistic and, for a given distribution of trade payoffs, the expected gains from trade are small. In this case the managers know that they will disagree very often and simply want to ensure that they realize as high a payoff as possible whenever they do disagree.
When assets are synergistic this is achieved by clustering the ownership rights of all assets and giving them to the party that has the highest outside value for the assets.
My result that asset clusters can minimize the bargaining inefficiency contrasts, at least superficially, with the results in Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987).
They extend Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) by allowing for more general ownership arrangements over the good that is to be traded (and also by allowing for more than two players). They show that the bargaining inefficiency can often be eliminated if the good is jointly owned by the players. Essentially, when the good is jointly owned the players are uncertain whether they will be the buyer or the seller of the good and this Finally, I do not allow for renegotiation of the bargaining game to which the managers commit ex ante. In particular, I assume that if, after having played the contractually specified bargaining game, the managers do not agree on the price of the input then they realize their disagreement payoffs even if the buyer's valuation is larger than the seller's cost. If the managers were unable to commit not to renegotiate, the bargaining inefficiency would necessarily be larger. The result above therefore shows that the upper envelope of the social welfare function can be decreasing in the aggregate disagreement payoff. One way to study the implications of allowing the managers to make offers until all gains from trade are realized is to study an explicit bargaining game (see, for instance, Myerson (1991) ). In Matouschek (2000) I analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which the managers alternate in making offers and the ownership structure determines their inside options, i.e. the payoffs they realize while they temporarily disagree. 22 There a reduction in the aggregate inside option accelerates agreement while making temporary disagreements more costly. The results are essentially the same as those presented above.
Applications and Conclusions
There are many situations in which players bargain over the sharing of possible gains from trade in the presence of private information. In this paper I have shown that, in such a situation, the players may have an incentive to take actions prior to the bargaining stage to reduce their aggregate disagreement payoff. Such a reduction increases the probability that the players reach efficient agreements but also increases the costs of disagreements and might even induce them to agree 'too often.' I have shown that it is optimal for players to minimize the aggregate disagreement payoff if the expected gains from trade are large and to maximize their aggregate disagreement payoff otherwise.
I believe that this analysis can be applied beyond the ownership structure of firms, as I have done above, and might also be applicable to other institutions and contractual
arrangements. An obvious, but possibly controversial, example is the marriage contract which reduces the aggregate disagreement payoff of a couple by giving veto rights over certain actions to both parties. Such a contract is typically signed by two people who anticipate being locked-in in the future and who might reasonably expect future bargaining inefficiencies due to presence of private information. In this interpretation the marriage contract is a means of facilitating domestic decision making, albeit one that comes at the cost of lower payoffs in the case of potential disagreements.
Another potential application, and one that is more closely related to the theory of the firm, is the optimal design of bankruptcy procedures (for an introduction see, for instance, Hart (1995) ). Bankruptcy procedures which put a hold on the claims of creditors and allow the incumbent management a period of time to reorganize their enterprise (such as Chapter 11 in the US) have been criticized for being cumbersome and time consuming. The arguments in this paper suggest that it might be possible to accelerate such bankruptcy procedures by reducing the aggregate payoff the parties realize during the negotiations, for example by limiting the business transactions the management is allowed to perform, and that such a change can reduce ex post inefficiencies that are due to private information. The analysis also seems applicable to the optimal design of strike legislation. In this context one could ask, for instance, if a firm should commit itself contractually not to use temporary replacement workers or not to run down inventories during strikes.
Finally, to the extent that the model can be extended to multilateral bargaining situations, arguments similar to those presented above might also be used to explain the institution that first motivated me to write this paper. In the Roman Catholic Church a new pope is elected by an assembly of cardinals who are locked up in a part of Vatican Palace until they reach an agreement. This institution, called a 'conclave,' originated in the 13th century when the cardinals failed to elect a new pope for two years. A local magistrate then decided to improve the cardinals' incentives to reach an agreement by making disagreement more uncomfortable for them. For this purpose he locked them up in the episcopal palace, removed its roof, and allowed them nothing but bread and water until they elected the next pope. 23 The observation that this institution has not been abandoned, and only somewhat adapted, suggests it might be efficient for the church as a whole, including the decision making cardinals, to accelerate the decision making process by lowering the payoff the cardinals realize during their negotiations.
While these examples suggest possible applications of the model developed above, they also raise an important final question, namely why, in my model, the managers cannot use contracts to manipulate their disagreement payoffs. Indeed, managers do sign contracts, such as exclusive supplier contracts, that reduce their disagreement payoffs and they might do so, at least partially, to facilitate ex post bargaining. I believe that the question of when managers use contracts and when they use ownership structures to manipulate their disagreement payoffs is an interesting and important one. However, I
leave this question for future research since we currently seem to lack a commonly accepted framework of partially incomplete contracts that would be necessary to fruitfully investigate this question.
15. Above I showed that another benefit associated with an increase in d is the reduction in the probability that managers realize ex ante inefficient trades. Note that this second benefit effect does not operate on the margin, i.e. it is only realized for sufficiently large discrete changes in d.
16. The incentive compatibility constraints ensure that each manager finds it optimal to make truthful announcements of his or her type and the interim individual rationality constraints ensure that, after learning their type, the managers prefer participating in the bargaining game to realizing the disagreement payoffs. 19. See also Hart (1995, p.48).
20. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that joint ownership can be optimal in a property rights model if the investments reduce the players' outside options. Halonen (1995) shows that in an infinitely repeated game with ex ante investments joint ownership can be optimal for reputational reasons. Also, de Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu 
